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Abstract
This paper studies key markets (financial, labor, natural resource, and product) to
assess how they are facilitating or constraining growth. First, we draw on the body of
existing theoretical and empirical literature to discuss the links between markets and
growth. Second, we present four stylized scenarios of the process of growth, which
summarize differences across six regions of the developing world. Financial market
infrastructure and efficient factor reallocation in response to shocks appear to be
among the most important growth determinants. We highlight the relative lack of
research on the relationship between labor markets and growth, as opposed to the
relationship between human capital production and growth. Finally, we combine
suggestions of Topel (1999) and Pritchett (2000) to argue that country-specific
markets should be a principal focus of future research on growth. This paper provides
a framework for such studies.
Abstrakt
Tento člÆnek zva￿uje jak kl￿čovØ trhy podporuj￿ nebo brzd￿ růst. Nejprve diskutujeme
vazby mezi trhy a růstem na zÆkladě existuj￿c￿ teoretickØ a empirickØ literatury. PotØ
presentujeme čtyři stylizovanØ růstovØ scØnÆře shrnuj￿c￿ zku￿enosti ￿esti světov￿ch
regionů. Mezi nejdůle￿itěj￿￿ determinanty růstu patř￿ infrastruktura finančn￿ch trhů a
efektivn￿ relokace v￿robn￿ch faktorů v odezvě na ekonomickØ ￿oky. Zat￿mco vztah
mezi lidsk￿m kapitÆlem a růstem je předmětem mnoha studi￿, my zdůrazňujeme
relativn￿ nedostatek v￿zkumu zaměřenØho na vztah mezi trhem prÆce a růstem.
Konečně kombinujeme nÆvrhy studi￿ Topel (1999) a Pritchett (2000) do zÆvěru, ￿e
budouc￿ v￿zkum ekonomickØho růstu by měl vychÆzet ze studi￿ zaměřen￿ch na
specifickØ trhy jednotliv￿ch zem￿. Tento člÆnek poskytuje rÆmec pro takovØto studie.
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1. Introduction
Markets are the mechanisms through which economic resources are channeled and where
economic incentives are set. Hence, their functioning is critical to both static and dynamic
efficiency as well as to the responsiveness of the economy to shocks. While both product and
factor markets are important in allocating resources, factor markets also influence the rate of
resource creation.
1  This paper will affirm that markets are crucial to growth and combine
suggestions of Topel (1999) and Pritchett (2000) to argue that country-specific markets should
be a principal focus of future research on growth.
We study key markets (financial, labor, natural resource, and product) to assess how they
are facilitating or constraining growth. First, we draw on the body of existing theoretical and
empirical literature to provide a framework for discussing the links between markets and growth.
Second, we summarize the findings of the six regional papers produced in the thematic area of
"Markets and Growth" for the Global Research Project (GRP) by presenting four stylized
scenarios of the process of growth, relevant for some of the regions or phases of development.
1.1 Research agenda
Macro growth regressions, not to mention growth accounting, are, for the most part,
uninformative about the mechanisms, by which the studied sources of growth are working.
2 They
are a useful data description tool, but are presently less able to provide a causal interpretation for
the estimated growth effects.
3 Growth regressions have serious econometric problems, starting
with the usual suspects of measurement error and endogeneity, and ending with (dynamic) miss-
specification.
4 While theory offers hypotheses about growth determinants and provides a
                                                
1 Conditions in labor markets influence the extent of acquisition of human capital. Financial markets determine the
amount of savings available to be transformed into domestic physical capital.
2 To give one major example, it is not clear yet from the existing empirical work, whether human capital affects the
level of output or its growth rate.
3 The regressions are often specified ad hoc, without a link to an underlying structural model. Recently, however,
Hall and Jones (1999) use variation in a country’s colonization language to instrument for social infrastructure in a
regression explaining the differences in levels of income. For a similar approach see Levine et al (2000).
4 For example, (moderate) inflation may have positive effects on growth in the short run, but negative effects in the
long run. More generally, growth can be decomposed into its steady state, transitional (off-steady-state), and cyclical
components, which each may have different determinants (Pritchett, 2000).2
description of some potential channels of effects, it is often surprisingly terse in many areas (see
Sections 2 to 5).
We believe that this lack of knowledge and testing methodology makes inquiry into
mechanisms of growth effects crucial for the growth research agenda. We would like to accent
the suggestion Topel (1999) made in his survey work on labor markets and growth, namely that
the most important and productive future research on growth entails "detailed empirical studies
of the operation of labor markets and the impact of policies and institutions within individual
countries". We see this objective much in line with the idea of the GRP project and would like to
extend this suggestion to all factor and commodity markets. We propose that country-specific
research can prove fruitful in distinguishing among existing growth theories and motivating new
ones; it can provide a deeper perspective on growth: a perspective focused on mechanisms by
which the determinants of growth affect the process of growth.
5
Yet, there are many possible interrelated determinants of growth working at different
time horizons and this curbs the use of a single-country experience for study of growth
determinants. The GRP country studies, however, can overcome this limitation by analyzing
external or internal shocks and episodes when growth patterns have been changed. Pritchett
(2000) shows that periods with large shifts in growth (up or down) are characteristic for most
developing countries and constitute the bulk of panel-data variation in growth rates; hence, they
are likely to provide important insight into the process of growth. The country-specific GRP
research can focus on such episodes and study what caused them (e.g., policies or institutions or
politics) and why some countries have been able to overcome shocks with little impact on
growth while others have been completely overwhelmed.
However, it is not clear how to cumulate knowledge from the country-specific studies.
While theorists can model relationships that appear important in certain regions, systematically
                                                
5 One avenue of research would first relate, e.g., markets infrastructure to measurable market-specific outcomes (i.e.
labor reallocation), and second relate the measured ability of markets to support the hypothesized channels of
growth to the aggregate outcome. This would allow for differentiating among competing hypotheses about growth
mechanisms. For example, is the level of human capital causing the ability to implement R&D as in the imitation
model of Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1990)?3
relating case studies of growth-change episodes and of market functioning to the macro
aggregate measures of growth may be an issue.
6 We find it useful to cumulate the preliminary
evidence of the regional thematic papers into stylized growth scenarios of the process of growth
(Section 6). These scenarios are linked to specific market mechanisms of growth (discussed in
Sections 2 to 5) and are aimed to provide a tentative framework for country-specific research.
1.2 General Organizational Structure
As we motivate above, our discussion of markets and growth will evolve around
mechanisms by which markets may affect the process of growth. Hence, each market-specific
section will begin by identifying the relevant market-specific mechanisms. However, in order to
provide a structure for our discussion of the ways in which markets can affect economic growth,
and to support identification of variables for subsequent analysis, we will use a simple
classification of market dimensions. Specifically, we focus on three dimensions: (1)
infrastructure, which refers to the institutional underpinnings, including laws and courts; (2)
price wedges or distortions due to policy interventions; and (3) participants, or the relevant
players, which are determined by competition policy, ownership structure, etc. Market
infrastructure aids processing of information and allocating resources. Removal of price
distortions from policy wedges increases economic activity by eliminating deadweight losses.
Finally, different types of participants in a given market may have differing incentives and
objectives, and the differing objectives across types of participants can impact market outcomes
(often through a political economy channel). In each market the three dimensions are interrelated
(e.g., the market infrastructure may determine the type of participants); however, treating each
dimension separately permits us to better distinguish between the effects of institutions and of
policies on economic growth.
7
                                                
6 One way to cumulate knowledge is to use the country-specific studies to identify exogenous variation in the
determinants of growth or detailed changes in policy, which can later be used in a regression framework.
7 It also allows us to identify potential links between the types of actors in each market and the potential effects on
economic growth, an issue which bridges the theme of markets and growth with that of the microeconomics of
growth.4
2. Financial markets
The positive association between financial-sector development and economic growth is
now a well-documented stylized fact. Since Goldsmith (1969) found that the level of financial
development, defined as financial intermediary assets divided by GDP, was positively associated
with economic growth, numerous authors have reconfirmed positive correlations between




Links between financial systems and economic growth occur through one or more of
three basic functions served by the financial sector in an economy: (1) the provision of adequate
instruments for saving; (2) the channeling of resources from savers to borrowers (the resource




Savings flowing into the financial sector may be increased by improvements in the
liquidity and breadth of financial assets, reductions in information asymmetries between firms
and outside investors, increases in the returns on financial instruments, and by reductions in
transactions costs related to financial assets. An increase in savings can increase growth by
permitting an increase in investment.
2.1.2 Channeling of funds
The efficiency with which the financial sector performs the allocation function￿i.e., the
selection and monitoring of firms and projects receiving external finance￿will also affect a
                                                
8 See, for example, Atje and Jovanovic (1993), Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000), Harris (1997), King and Levine
(1993), Levine (1997, 1999), Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000), Levine and Zervos (1996, 1998), Rajan and
Zingales (1998), and Wurgler (2000).  Techniques used to test for causality consist of the use of instruments for
variables whose values are believed to be determined simultaneously with growth.
9 We focus here on the functions of the financial system that are most influential for growth. In reality, the financial
sector performs more than these three functions; for example, the financial sector serves a critical role in the
payments system and in risk transformation of assets.  (For a broad description of the functions of financial systems,
see Levine, 1997.)5
country￿s growth rate. Theory offers some indications of the ways in which financial sector
development could result in more efficient channeling of resources from savers to borrowers and
in increasing growth. Diamond (1984) suggests that financial intermediaries can perform
monitoring and screening at lower cost than individual investors. Greenwood and Jovanovic
(1990) argue that financial intermediaries are better able to identify investment opportunities
than are individuals. Harrison, Sussman, and Zeira (1999) assume that the costs of monitoring
borrowers are a function of the distance between banks and their borrowers; therefore, as more
banks enter the financial system, regional specialization occurs, monitoring costs fall, and
investment increases. Bencivenga, Smith, and Starr  (1996) show that a beneficial effect of the
increase in liquidity of financial assets arising from the development of secondary securities
markets, which allow transfer of financial assets across individuals, is to permit short-term
savings to be directed into long-gestation production technologies, which may generate greater
long-run returns than short-gestation technologies.
2.1.3 Reallocation of funds
Finally, the efficiency with which the financial system reallocates resources from
unprofitable to profitable uses will affect economic growth. For example, the existence and terms
of bankruptcy provisions can influence the degree of effort that firm managers exert, the point at
which unprofitable firms are closed down, and the efficiency with which a liquidated firm￿s
assets are channeled to more profitable uses.
10
2.2 Market dimensions
Each of the dimensions of infrastructure, policy wedges, and participants in financial
markets can influence economic growth through their impact on any or all of the three functions
that the financial system performs. We consider each of the dimensions in turn.
2.2.1 Market infrastructure
Elements of financial market infrastructure that are important for financial sector
                                                
10 See, for example, Aghion and Bolton  (1995), Gertner and Scharfstein (1992)6
development and growth include institutions such as courts that facilitate contract enforcement;
accounting rules requiring firms to disclose adequate information to outside investors; and laws
(such as bankruptcy laws) protecting the rights of outside investors. Well developed financial
market infrastructure will increase the supply of savings flowing to firms by ensuring that
financial contracts are honored and outside investors￿ rights are protected. Accounting rules
requiring adequate information disclosure by firms should improve the efficiency of resource
allocation. As suggested above, bankruptcy laws (and other guarantees of creditors￿ and
shareholders￿ rights) could be expected to improve the efficiency of the reallocation of resources.
Little theory exists relating financial market infrastructure to growth. Numerous
empirical studies involving cross-country growth regressions have, however, included variables
representing infrastructure.
11 To the extent that the results of these studies capture causal
relationships, infrastructure indeed appears to be important.  Variables focused on in such studies
include indicators of creditors￿ and/or shareholders￿ rights,
12 an indicator of the degree of law
and order, an indicator of contract enforcement, an indicator of accounting standards, and
indicators of corruption or government interference in financial markets. A variable indicating
legal origin (constructed by La Porta et al (1997, 1998)) is also sometimes used as an instrument
for infrastructure variables.
Whereas results of cross-country regressions suggest a potential role for legal and
accounting institutions in increasing growth, it may be useful to distinguish￿under the rubric of
financial infrastructure￿between general indicators of a commitment to the rule of law or to
contract enforcement and more targeted measures, such as improvement of accounting standards
or of shareholders￿ and creditors￿ rights. An important question is whether the general
commitment to law and order (which may also represent the elimination of corruption) is a
stronger determinant of financial sector development and of growth than are more specific
                                                
11 See, for example, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Filer, Campos and Hanousek  (1999), Levine (1999),
Levine et al (2000), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Wurgler (2000).
12 These variables were constructed and originally used by La Porta et al (1997, 1998).7
measures aimed at protecting creditors￿ or shareholders￿ rights. The significance of the
commitment to law and order is that it guarantees that the government will not expropriate the
assets or profits of private owners and investors. Once a minimum commitment to the rule of law
has been established, the implementation of more specific protections for shareholders and
creditors may become more important.
13 Within-country analysis of data relating to the
commitment to the rule of law versus specific infrastructure reforms would shed light on this
question and could feed into cross-country analysis.
2.2.2 Policy wedges
Typical distortions created by financial sector policy relate to restrictions on interest rates
and reserve requirements on bank deposits. Financial repression, which results in imposition of
interest-rate ceilings on bank deposits or on rates charged on loans to certain sectors, can reduce
savings and can also distort the allocation of resources. In addition, politically motivated directed
lending represents an implicit form of policy wedge, which leads to ￿soft budget constraints￿ for
firms benefiting from the lending and, therefore, to poor performance of the financial sector in
reallocating resources.
Financial liberalization policies may eliminate the distortions created by financial
repression. It is a well recognized theoretical result, however, that financial liberalization has an
ambiguous effect on saving, due to the presence of income and substitution effects following an
increase in the interest rate. There is also some evidence (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998,
cited in Caprio and Honohan, 1999) that banking crises often follow financial liberalizations.
Yet, this outcome may reflect more a weak financial market infrastructure, which leaves
regulators ill-equipped to adequately supervise newly liberalized financial intermediaries.
2.2.3 Participants
Important participants in financial markets include financial intermediaries and individual
investors providing outside finance to firms through stock markets. Recent cross-country
                                                
13 Empirical evidence from economies in transition suggests that a commitment to law and order may be a
precondition for financial development. See Filer et al (2000).8
empirical research that attempts to assess the relative importance of financial intermediaries and
stock markets concludes that the relative weight of each in the financial system does not appear
to matter.
14 Since the typical path of financial sector development is for the banking sector to
develop first, followed later by stock market development, we focus our attention here on
financial intermediaries. Potentially important distinctions between types of financial
intermediaries are state versus private banks, differences in the qualifications of owners of
private banks, and foreign versus domestic banks.
The nature of bank ownership and management can significantly affect the efficiency of
resource allocation and reallocation by the banking sector. Banks must have both the ability and
the incentives to identify and invest in profitable firms and to halt lending to unprofitable firms.
Conditions that would be expected to lower banks￿ incentives to allocate (or reallocate) resources
efficiently include: (1) government pressure on banks to lend to particular firms or sectors for
political reasons; (2) pressure on banks by governments to purchase government debt; (3) too
few constraints on banks￿ activities, either because supervision is inadequate or restrictions on
entry into banking are too lax; and (4) banks that are themselves in financial distress, in which
case limited liability results in excessive risk-taking and hiding of bad loans. Conditions (1) and
(2) may be more likely to hold when banks are state-owned. In any case, government
interference in bank lending is common in developing countries (Caprio and Honohan, 1999).
Conditions (3) and (4) have a negative effect on the financial sector￿s resource allocation
and reallocation functions through inefficient investment behavior on the part of banks. Banking
regulations will influence the extent to which conditions (3) and (4) hold.  Regulations that
would be expected to guard against inefficient investment behavior include regulation of entry
into the banking sector, capital adequacy requirements, rules relating to loan classification and
                                                
14 Variables that appear in cross-country  regressions  to be more correlated with growth than the structure of the
financial system per se include laws protecting stockholders and creditors, accounting standards, and overall
financial system development. (See Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2000, Levine, 2000, and Demirguc-Kunt
and Maksimovic, 2000.)9
loan-loss provisions, restrictions on bank activities, and adequate handling of banks with high
levels of nonperforming loans.
A high rate of entry into the banking sector can sometimes cause more harm than good,
despite the fact that entry increases competition.
15 Two sources of danger arising from lax entry
policies are difficulties in regulating a larger versus a smaller number of banks and the increased
riskiness of loans made by banks faced with competition-induced declining spreads between
interest rates on loans and deposits. Banking sector problems arising from poor banking
supervision or from excessive entry into banking by unqualified bankers are thus potentially
harmful to growth. Several transition economies and Sub-Saharan African economies have
suffered banking crises as a result of excessively lax restrictions on entry into the banking sector.
Research examining links between conditions such as (1) ￿ (4) and growth is sparse.
Some empirical evidence relating to state ownership of banks is offered by Barth, Caprio, and
Levine (2000), who report preliminary results from an ongoing research project in which data on
bank regulation and ownership have been collected from over sixty countries. They find that
state ownership of banks is significantly and negatively correlated with financial sector
development.
16 La Porta et al (1999) collect data on state ownership of the ten largest banks in
over ninety countries, including twelve transition economies. They find that their measure of
government ownership is significantly and negatively correlated with subsequent financial
development, measured by the growth in the ratio of private credit to GDP.
3. Labor Markets
In contrast to financial markets, the role of labor markets in affecting growth has not yet
become a major topic of empirical analysis. This is especially surprising given the (above
surveyed) extended empirical research linking financial markets to growth performance.
                                                
15 As we point out in Section 5, an increase in competition in product markets can also have ambiguous effects on
growth.
16 Perhaps surprisingly, Barth et al also find that restrictions on the range of bank activities, such as laws preventing
banks from operating in real estate, insurance, or securities markets, have no beneficial effect on financial sector
development and are even positively correlated with banking sector instability.10
Furthermore, the existing empirical work, including a survey from 1999 on labor markets and
growth by Robert Topel, studies only one aspect of labor markets: the effect of human capital
accumulation on growth. This reflects the almost exclusive focus of labor-market-related growth
theory on human capital (HC). We will take a broader view, building also on a large body of
empirical literature on labor-market flexibility, which is, if only implicitly, related to growth.
3.1 Growth Mechanisms
The economic links from labor markets to growth are likely to occur through the
allocation (and mass reallocation) function of labor markets and through their role in supporting
the production and efficient use of HC. The links from growth to labor markets, on the other
hand, are likely to occur though the build-up of infrastructure as a result of economic growth.
3.1.1 Production of Human Capital
Human capital is the "engine" of workhorse growth models and lies at the heart of the
revival of growth economics. There are two important causal links from HC to growth in the
theory: First, in the neoclassical growth models, increases in HC cause growth as HC is one of
the main inputs to the production. Second, Nelson and Phelps (1966) suggest that higher stock of
HC makes technological innovations and therefore growth more likely. The first channel
suggests that an increase in HC leads to a one-time increase in production, while the second
implies that the effect of increasing HC on output is permanent.
17 Neither theory implies how
labor markets can impede or foster HC creation and use.
There is only limited empirical evidence on the process that relates HC and growth. At
the micro level, schooling increases productivity when included in en estimated production
function (see, e.g., Griliches, 1997, for references) and schooling is a causal determinant of
individual income (Card, 1999). However, the definition of HC used in growth theory covers not
only schooling, but also accumulation of knowledge or abilities to conceive and implement new
ideas, labor-augmenting technology, and possibly even social capital.  It is hard to measure these
                                                
17 The second channel is supported by micro-evidence (e.g., Welch, 1966).11
concepts and they do not differentiate the ability to apply knowledge in productive ways from
technical progress. Still, the measure of HC used in macro empirical work is typically
educational attainment, capturing only one form of knowledge.
18 The existing empirical results
based on educational attainment measures of HC are mixed, at the best.
19 Yet, given the
overwhelming (causal) evidence from micro studies, and the strong theoretical foundation of
growth in HC, one is pressed to ask how HC is created (and what affects its use).
Is the tentative evidence of the regional papers on markets and growth consistent with the
view that HC should be the centerpiece of growth research? The evidence is puzzling since
school attainment measures grow consistently in most countries, but output does not.  While in
the East Asian countries and in some Latin American countries large investments in HC by the
youth coincide with dramatic increases in growth rates, there are other countries (e.g., in the
MNA region) where growing stock of HC was associated with little productivity growth. The
ECA region has a highly educated work force and an enormous potential for technology adoption
and imitation; yet, this potential is far from being realized in many of the ECA countries.
20
Hence, at first glance, HC does not appear to be the main determinant of differences in
growth rates across countries. At second glance, however, one can consider HC a necessary but
not sufficient condition for growth and look at labor markets for an explanation why (growing)
HC stock was not put to its best use in some countries. This perspective stresses the role of HC
allocation as opposed to HC production. We take up this issue within the context of the
following two subsections, focusing on labor allocation and reallocation.
3.1.2 Allocation of Labor
                                                
18 Further, while increases in years of schooling at low levels of human capital in less-developed countries are likely
to correspond to an actual increase in the amount of human capital, in developed economies additional human
capital is often produced even if educational attainment grows only slowly (i.e. quality of education; e.g., use of
computers). In fact, education policy in the more developed countries has recently turned attention toward pre-
primary schooling, transition from school to work, and adult education. Indeed, Hanushek and Kimko (2000)
recently show that human capital quality is strongly related to growth.
19 However, Topel (1999) and Krueger and Lindahl (2000) recently find macro returns to schooling in line with
those estimated in the Mincerian wage regressions.
20 One explanation for the puzzle could be differences in HC quality, but this only appears potentially important in
the ECA region where cognitive skills test reveal low ability of workers to process and analyze information.12
The ability to allocate existing resources (i.e., labor, HC) across economic sectors,
occupations, or regions is, at an intuitive level, crucial for static efficiency. Further, one can
hypothesize that the apparent lack of explanatory power of HC for growth may be related to
miss-allocation and therefore to the functioning of labor markets. The allocation function of
labor markets would then be as important as the key theoretical role of HC in driving growth.
The country-specific question is then not only how Korea increased its stock of HC, but how did
it increase also its labor utilization, and non-agricultural labor force (Topel, 1999)? On the other
hand, one must ask why are most degree holders entering the labor market in Egypt hired by the
public sector and how much this affects growth.
The effect of misallocation is twofold: First, present-day efficiency of allocation is lower.
Second, misallocation may lead to build-up of political economy obstacles to reallocation:
pressure groups that benefited from misallocation rents will oppose efficiency-enhancing reforms
and this opposition to reform may form a long-term obstacle to growth.
A strong effect on growth through allocation of resources probably comes through high
labor taxation. This issue is of primary concern only in developed industrialized economies (see,
e.g., Tabellini and Daveri, 1997, and the references therein) as direct labor taxation is low in
most developing countries. Yet, labor taxation is important in many ECA post-communist
countries where the welfare state commitments inherited from the communist era misallocation
of resources result in high statutory contribution rates and excessive labor taxation.
3.1.3 Labor Reallocation
A tightly related issue is the labor markets’ ability of massive reallocation, i.e. the ability
to successfully deal with extensive (initial) misallocation or with external shocks. It is crucial for
transitional growth of countries off the steady-state path. For example, extensive reallocation of
labor appears to be needed in the ECA region as a result of communist misallocation, in the SAS
region as a result of the doctrine of economic nationalism, or in the MNA region as a result of
misuse of high oil revenues in the 1970s.
Large shocks occur often in less-developed countries and often appear to establish13
turning points differentiating between multiple growth equilibria. For example, the initial
misallocation of labor on communist labor markets resulted in workers moving from over-stuffed
heavy industries to services, finance and trade in the European transition economies. In contrast,
Russia and parts of the former Soviet Union were not that successful and the initial transition
often resulted in an increase in agricultural employment, reversing the process of economic
development. This distinction is likely to drive long-term growth prospects.
3.2 Market Dimensions
Let us now draw on the preceding discussion and on the GRP regional papers to consider
the labor-market dimensions that may affect the three labor-market growth mechanisms.
3.2.1 Market Infrastructure
The important labor market infrastructure includes: (i) transportation, housing (and
mortgage) market, and residency restrictions; (ii) schooling systems; (iii) market-clearing
mechanisms such as channels of information on vacancies; (iv) protection against diversion; (v)
labor code and regulations; and (vi) social security. While there is extensive empirical research
on the effects of (v) and (vi) on many labor-market outcomes and some theoretical research on
growth effects of (ii) and (iii), many of these issues appear not covered in length in the existing
growth research agenda.
Functioning  housing market  and transportation infrastructure clearly improve the
allocation function of labor markets; further, closely related mortgage markets improve the
ability of workers to reallocate from regions with high unemployment to thriving areas. The
latter is likely to be especially important in geographically dispersed (large) developing
countries, for example in Russia, where massive misallocation under central planning led to non-
viable industrialization of far-north isolated regions. (Note that the proposed growth effects lead
to specific research questions. For example, to study whether territorial mobility restrictions curb
growth through an effect on human capital allocation, one can relate region-time-specific labor-
market outcomes such as unemployment, education-occupation match or productivity to
variation in housing-market regulation and/or residential-permit policy.)14
Schooling systems produce human capital; hence, their direct effect on the HC growth
mechanism. Reforms promoting the quality and supplied quantity of education are likely to
improve the chances of a country to grow. An important related issue of HC accumulation has to
do with social returns to education being higher than private returns. Existence of positive
externalities and spillover effects of education calls for government support of schooling.
21
Finally, the ability of schools to adjust focus (curricula) to market needs also affects the
allocation of labor and HC on the labor market.
Poor quality of market-clearing mechanisms (such as information channels used in
hiring) will clearly negatively affect the allocation function of labor markets. Labor market
segmentation (along, for example, ethnic dimensions) also negatively affects market clearing.
However, it also alters schooling and HC accumulation: Since students will expect their class
status determine their labor-market careers, segmentation will also affect HC production. If
innovative activity and social mobility play an important role in determining growth, policy
should support equal schooling and innovations (entrepreneurs).
22
Rule of law and protection against diversion are likely to play an important role in both
creation and use of HC on labor markets: if the benefits of innovations are not protected by law,
few will invest in research; if benefits of entrepreneurship are grabbed by either organized crime
or state, few will become (innovative) entrepreneurs. The regional papers indeed suggest that
extensive diversion (grabbing hand)
23 will preclude a rise in productive type of self-employment
and force even well-educated (ECA) workers to self-subsistence agriculture.
24
The ability to reallocate labor is likely to be related to the popular notion of labor markets
flexibility (lack of rigidity). Labor codes and regulations, i.e. labor-market flexibility (and its
                                                
21 Schooling is also affected by the difference between private and state schools (Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992),
decentralized and centralized school finance, or segregation of students with heterogeneous ability (Benabou, 1996).
22 E.g., Hassler and Mora (2000) focus on the interaction of intelligence (HC channel) and social mobility
(allocation channel) in affecting growth. In their model, higher growth entails new technology adoption which
makes intelligence more important (as opposed to social position of parents). As a result, growth makes intelligence
better rewarded, which again feeds back into easier adoption of technology and more growth.
23 See, e.g., Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000).
24 This may be particularly important given that self-employed and small firms appear to be the driving force of
growth in ECA (see, e.g., Jurajda and Terrell, 2000; or Selowsy, Mitra, et. al , 2001).15
effect on worker mobility), has become a major object of empirical research.
25 Much of this
research focuses on job security regulation (e.g., high firing costs and limited part-time or fixed-
term contracts). While there are undisputed benefits to recipients of job protection, there is
disagreement over the extent to which regulation is responsible for the difference in equilibrium
(un)employment rates and worker mobility: Blank (1994) and Freeman (2000), among others,
argue that regulations are not harmful, while, e.g., OECD (1994), Burgess (1994), and Michie
and Grieve-Smith (1997) claim that they matter. Heckman and PagØs-Serra (2000) analyze the
role of job security provisions using natural experiments from the recent history of Latin
American countries and establish that such regulations have a substantial negative impact on the
level of employment and especially on youth. Looking both across countries (Burgess, 1994) and
U.S. states (Dertouzos and Karoly, 1993) the evidence is that employment protection legislation
slows down structural adjustment and the reallocation of labor from declining industries to
innovative, growing industries. To the extent that structural reallocation is an important growth
ingredient, labor market regulation affects growth.
26 However, the evidence from the regional
thematic papers appears to suggest that an important empirical question related to regulations in
developing countries is the degree to which they are enforced.
While, e.g., labor market segmentation, impediments to labor mobility, and other
rigidities have been recognized as obstacles to growth and studied in developing countries (e.g.
Collier and Gunning, 1999; Agenor, 1996), there is relatively little research looking at the
importance of social safety for massive reallocation and growth.
27 The ability to deal with large
shocks may be improved if workers can rely on social safety net while searching for new jobs
and do not plunge into poverty (and self-substance home plotting). On the other hand, social
                                                
25 Yet, there appears little applied theoretical work on the issue, unless we note that reallocation also means transfer
of innovation and/or organizational practices across sectors. In the Schumpeterian models (e.g., Romer, 1990)
growth depends on the rate of innovation generated in the economy.
26 A related issue is entry into self-employment/entrepreneurship and the amount of red tape. The issue of firm
closings and startups is taken up in see Section 2.
27 Much western research also suggests that the design of a country’s unemployment system can have a major effect
on the equilibrium level of unemployment (e.g., Mortenson and Pissarides, 1998a, 1998b). The issue of
unemployment benefits disincentives and more generally welfare traps in developing countries is probably only
relevant for the more successful ECA countries and we will not dwell upon it here due to space constraints.16
safety nets require high levels of labor taxation, which appears harmful to economic growth.
Finally, an important related ingredient of many recent growth stories is labor force participation.
It is shaped by demography, but to a large extent also by incentives set in the labor market
including social safety net and unconstrained wage setting (see below). Output per capita
increases even if bad macroeconomic policies remain in place as long as participation increases.
3.2.2 Policy wedges
The most important price wedge  on the labor market occurs through wage-setting
distortions (minimum wage, centralized compressed wage structure, massive taxation and
redistribution). Compressed wage distribution adversely affects HC accumulation in a stylized
theoretical growth scenario: In the Lucas-Uzawa framework , recently surveyed by Topel (1999),
HC is accumulated endogenously, as a result of individual optimal investment decisions
sacrifying present consumption for future returns. Incentives to invest in HC are related to
rewards to such investments, which are carried by a flexible wage structure.
28 In a market-driven
scenario of (Kuznets) growth, exports propel the demand for industrial output, which in turn
raises the demand for skilled labor and consequently the skill wage premium. This leads to
investment in HC and consequently growth. This growth story requires, among other conditions,




The relevant participants on labor markets are government-sector employment and other
pressure groups as opposed to employment in small firms, home production, and the shadow
economy.
30 The first type of participants (pressure groups, labor unions) is likely related to
                                                
28 Hence, to verify the effect of wage-setting policy wedges on human capital production in a country-specific
context, one can relate measures of returns to education to HC investment.
29 Artificially high wages in the public sector represent another important growth-detrimental policy wedge, but this
issue is discussed in Section 4 on natural resources.
30 Another set of players are ethnic groups since market-clearing mechanisms, one of the components of market
infrastructure, are affected by segmentation arising from ethnic or class identity of groups of workers/players.17
political economy constraints on growth. If those who would lose from efficient restructuring
block reforms, this surely affects the labor markets’ ability to support efficient reallocation.
A strand of theoretical models called Optimal Speed of Transition theory (e.g., Aghion
and Blanchard, 1994; Castanheira and Roland, 2000) relates to the political economy problems
of massive reallocation. These models are motivated by the transition of post-communist
economies, but are relevant for extensive reallocation in other regions, e.g. for a situation in
which an over-staffed public sector puts a heavy burden on the private sector, which is thus
incapable of creating large numbers of ￿good￿ jobs. They model the reallocation of labor (and
capital) from an inefficient over-sized (state) sector to a growing efficient (private) sector. This
strand of literature advocates gradual phasing out of the inefficient sector as optimal based on, in
part, political economy constraints. Too fast a downsizing of the inefficient sector creates
obstacles to successful reallocation and slows down growth.
Indeed, the tentative evidence from the regional thematic papers suggests that the
establishment of pressure groups (as a result of initial misallocation of resources) is a major
obstacle to successful reallocation.
31  Buying out workers who are harmed by first-choice
economic reforms may be one solution to this obstacle to growth (e.g., in MNA).
4. Natural Resource Markets
32
So far, we have discussed the factor markets for capital and labor. As it is common to
view natural resources, including land, as an additional factor of production, we will consider the
relevance of natural resource markets for economic growth.
The current consensus is that natural resource abundance depresses economic growth
(e.g., Sachs and Warner, 1995). The main upshot of the literature is twofold: First, natural
resources, if not well managed in well-built markets, will impede growth thorough rent seeking.
                                                
31 E.g., in the MNA region. Supporting this observation, Forteza and Rama (2000) study the implications of labor
market rigidity for the success of economic reforms and conclude that the political dimension of rigidity is
important, i.e. the size of organized labor and public employment.
32 This section draws heavily on the natural-resource part of the ECA "Markets and Growth" paper written by
Thorvaldur Gylfasson and on McMahon (1997), both of which include an extensive list of references.18
Second, abundance of natural resources leads to serious policy failures: the windfall from a
natural-resource boom if misplaced, sometimes with long-run detrimental effects.
Natural-resource abundance tends to induce rent-seeking behavior that can take many
forms, including corruption and looting and consequently increase the degree of diversion in the
whole economy. The interaction of markets with this growth mechanism is very strong in that the
ability to circumvent or thwart markets is often a precondition of rent seeking. A natural
consequence of rent-seeking control of valuable resources (e.g., oil) is then buildup of interest
(pressure) groups, which may further impede efficient allocation of resources and which often
directly influence politics. Rent seeking is therefore both a consequence and a source of market
failure. What fails is primarily market infrastructure: property-rights protection. Rent seeking
appears present in all resource-rich areas, including ECA. In SSA it takes the extreme form of
looting. For example, Collier and Hoeffler (1998) find that a dependence on natural resources
strongly increases the risk of civil war.
An abundance of natural resources also often leads to policy failures and results,
typically, in a serious misallocation of resources, high inflation, and build up of pressure groups:
When the windfall from natural resources is captured by the state, it is often used to (i)
offer highly paid jobs in a bloated public sector (as for example in Cote d’Ivore or Egypt), (ii)
finance extensive public projects or state-owned industrial enterprises (Nigeria or Trinidad and
Tobago), and (iii) support import substitution policies and/or subsidies to non-natural-resource
industries (Venezuela). Such increase in government spending is hard to reverse when oil prices
drop as pressure groups lobby for their subsidies. Next, excessive foreign borrowing results in
inflation and indebtedness. The country becomes highly dependent on the (fluctuation in) raw
material prices in world markets, which results in large external shocks to the economy as it is
difficult for the government to smooth revenues and even harder to cut down on spending
programs started during natural-resource boom periods.19
When the windfall is distributed to the population, wrong policies are often in place, such
as restricted access to foreign capital markets. This leads to the windfall being invested in
construction or other activities leading to little increase in productivity.
The market dimension playing an important role here is players: governments and public
employment. One of the apparent reasons for policy failure is a false sense of security of
governments of resource-rich countries. The country-specific research question is then why,
given the high propensity to misallocate oil windfall, did Indonesia apparently manage its
windfall well, while, e.g., Venezuela invested in growth-impeding import substitution (Gelb,
1988). The policy response to natural resource booms may have to do with market infrastructure
before the boom, which is testable.
There are also other mechanisms potentially relating natural resources to lower growth,
which consider the trade-off between manufacturing and natural-resource extraction. It is argued
that manufacturing contributes larger positive externalities compared to the natural-resource
sector. A reallocation of resources away from the manufacturing sector then impedes learning by
doing, while, say, mineral-resource production occurs without any linkages to the rest of the
economy. This argument is at heart of the Dutch-disease or the linkage theories. When the high-
rent natural-resource-based industries thrive in presence of high real exchange rates and wages,
other industries are smothered with the Dutch disease: this lowers the growth of high-tech
capital-intensive or high-skill labor-intensive industries, which typically offer large growth
externalities, such as learning, R&D and technology adoption. The disease is a consequence of a
general market failure, not that of particular market dimension. An effective cure may involve
distortion-free resource rent fees or subsidies to high-externality industries.
Finally, resource abundance in agriculture leads to an overemphasis on low-skill
education. However, low-skilled labor is not versatile and becomes less useful in other
industries; workers with few options tend to oppose reallocation when resource prices plummet
and reallocation is needed (see Section 3).20
5.  Product markets
Product markets affect growth through the efficiency of the mix of goods and services
produced, the rate at which productivity-enhancing innovation occurs, and the ease of firm
creation. A mix of goods that does not reflect an economy￿s comparative advantage does not
allow exports to grow at the rate that they otherwise would. Production of goods for which the
production process generates positive externalities with respect to growth (such as learning by
doing or acquisition of ￿tacit￿ knowledge) can also enhance growth.
33 The ease with which new
firms may be created may also influence the amount of innovation in an economy and the ability
of markets to reallocate resources from unprofitable to profitable sectors.
Market infrastructure: Important elements of market infrastructure with respect to
product markets include public infrastructure, such as transportation and telecommunications
networks, and the prevalence of patents. Adequate public infrastructure lowers transactions and
production costs for firms and increases production. The quality of infrastructure may also
influence the level of foreign investment. The prevalence of patents influences firms￿ incentives
to innovate. The greater the ease of obtaining a patent for an innovation, the greater are firms￿
incentives to innovate and the higher the resulting rate of growth.
Policy wedges: Policies such as preferential taxes and subsidies to particular sectors,
quotas or tariffs on imports, and laws governing export and import licensing may influence
growth through their effect on the mix of goods produced. For example, import substitution
policies adopted by South Asia have been cited as one of the key explanations for the low growth
rates of this region from the 1960s to the 1980s.
34
Participants: Elements of what was described above as financial market infrastructure,
such as a commitment to private property rights and to contract enforcement, can influence the
types of participants in product markets. The commitments to contract enforcement and to
                                                
33 Schumpeterian models of growth (as discussed in Aghion and Howitt, 1998) emphasize growth as occurring
through product (or capital) improvements via innovation. New capital or products render old technology or
products obsolete (creative destruction).
34 See Tendulkar and Sen (2001).21
property rights ensure that firms￿ profits will not be seized by the government or corrupt
officials. These commitments can affect the willingness of private and foreign firms to enter into
differing markets.
Another element of infrastructure with a potential impact on the amount of innovation
concerns restrictions on the creation of firms. If regulations regarding the formation of new firms
are very strict, then innovative entrepreneurs may be discouraged from forming firms, thereby
slowing the rate of innovation and economic growth. Regulations restricting entry and the
formation of new firms will also affect the proportion of private firms in a market and the
distribution of established versus new firms. Governments that implement restrictive entry
policies may do so in order to protect state-owned firms or firms whose managers wield political
influence.
35 The potentially negative effects of such policies on productivity, innovation, and
growth are clear.
These observations lead to the question of whether an increase in product market
competition promotes growth. The theoretical relationship between competition and growth is in
fact ambiguous. On the one hand, increased competition lowers incentives for managerial effort
or innovation because of the lower level of profit that can be sustained from the extra effort. On
the other hand, increased competition motivates managers of inefficient firms to exert more
effort in order to avoid being driven out of the market.
Several theoretical papers have played on the ambiguous relationship between product
market competition and managerial effort. Hart (1983) and Scharfstein (1988) show that
managerial effort is not only a function of the level of potential profit (or of competition) but also
of the nature of firm managers￿ objectives. Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1999) take this idea
further and analyze a model where managerial objectives, combined with financial market
efficiency, play a significant role in determining which effect dominates. When firm managers
are profit-maximizers, an increase in competition will lower profit and, consequently, innovation
                                                
35 Djankov et al (2000) collect data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 75 countries and find a correlation
of entry restrictions with corruption.22
and productivity (and growth). When firm managers care about their private benefits of control,
competition will discipline the managers (by removing financial ￿slack￿) and force them to
innovate more often, thereby increasing economic growth.
36 Given the prevalence in many
developing economies of state-owned firms, firms benefiting from special government
protection, and a generally weak legal protection of outside creditors and shareholders, we see
these results as highlighting the important role that increased competition can play in disciplining
firm management and enhancing growth.
37
Openness, which represents a removal of policy wedges linked to international trade, can
also influence the types and behavior of participants in product markets. Openness may generate
benefits from any of the following: economies of scale (possibly arising from learning by doing)
due to the increase in the size of the market; the disciplinary effect on inefficient firms due to the
increase in competition; or more rapid diffusion of technology, as entry of foreign firms or
products makes transfer of technology easier.
According to Ahn and Hemmings (2000), results from empirical studies on the impact of
openness on growth are mixed, although recent studies seem to have confirmed a positive
relationship between trade and growth. Two caveats to these results should be noted. First,
causality probably runs in both directions; therefore, the question of causality needs to be
addressed. Second, many studies make use of a binary openness indicator constructed by Sachs
and Warner (1995), which includes a number of differing dimensions relating to policy wedges,
nature of market participants, and market infrastructure.
38 Such an indicator makes it difficult to
identify the exact mechanism by which openness might be affecting growth. For example,
                                                
36 Note that the assumption that financial markets adequately perform the function of eliminating unprofitable firms
is crucial to these results. This implies that the efficiency of financial markets, together with firm managers￿
objectives, plays a role in determining the effects of increased product-market competition on innovation and
growth.
37 Empirical studies that have reported a positive correlation between competition and productivity growth include
Nickell (1996) and Blundell et al (1995). See Ahn and Hemmings (2000) for a discussion of studies reporting a
negative relationship between market regulation and growth.
38 Sachs and Warner define an economy to be open if all of the following conditions holds: 1) average tariffs less
than 40%; 2) quotas and licensing cover less than 40 % of imports; 3) the black market premium is less than 20%; 4)
non-socialist economy; 5) state does not have a monopoly in major exports.23
Rodriguez and Rodrik, (1999) suggest that two of the components of this indicator (size of the
black market premium and the existence of a state monopoly on exports) are primarily
responsible for its statistical power. The black market premium could be an indicator of
macroeconomic policy as much as of openness. Similarly, a negative relationship between the
existence of a state monopoly on exports and growth may be more directly attributable to state
ownership than to openness.
6. Four Growth Stories
In this section we present four ￿scenarios,￿ or growth stories coming from the regional
growth papers. Each relates to experience in some region during some period and highlights
what seems to emerge as a key theme in explaining the growth performance. These scenarios
should be interpreted as tentative and exploratory. We use them, first, as an expositional device
in our discussion of regional growth experience. At the same time, the scenarios also embody
hypotheses that could be explored in future country-level and regional research. Such focus is in
line with the research agenda outlined in the introduction. By distilling patterns of growth from
the past, we seek to identify both the past pitfalls and the future policy implications. Within each
scenario, we highlight the involved market mechanisms of growth discussed above.
After discussing each scenario and the region(s) to which it applies, we raise caveats and
unresolved questions. The four stories focus on the following themes: (1) Importance of
openness policies; (2) Market flexibility in response to major shocks; (3) Influence of high
natural resource endowments; and (4) Consistently low growth (the everything’s wrong story).
Scenario (1) identifies a theme arising from experience in EAP and SAS. Scenario (2)
characterizes experience in ECA in the 1990s, in some MNA countries in the 1980s, in LAC in
the 1980s, and possibly in some SSA countries in the 1970s and 1980s.  Scenario (3) describes
the MNA region and may tell part of the story in SSA. Finally, scenario (4) describes several
countries in SSA that have exhibited consistently low growth rates over very long periods.
6.1 Openness
East Asian countries, which started with comparable rates of income per capita as South24
Asia in the 1960s, consistently improved their growth rates from 1960-1997, whereas South Asia
did not. East Asia switched from import substitution policies to export-oriented policies earlier.
This, in short, motivates our first story.
The first scenario is essentially a story of market-driven Kuznets-type growth, in which
openness policies raise the potential of a developing country to export and therefore attract
investment into manufacturing. Rising exports then propel the demand for industrial output,
which in turn raises the demand for skilled labor.  A higher skill wage premium leads to
investment in human capital (and/or a higher participation rate in a country with many educated
non-participants) and movement of labor force from agriculture (villages) to manufacturing
(cities). The story involves a significant increase in the level of human capital (of youth) and an
expansion of employment in high-skill industries (manufacturing), accompanied by increasing
technology adoption, positive externalities spilling from manufacturing into other industries, and
the concurrent development of financial markets.
39 This process of growth also entails a large
movement of labor force from rural to urban areas and an initial increase in inequality, which
may later be reversed by a growing supply of degree holders. Real wages grow together with
productivity (but not faster).
This success scenario hinges on (i) openness, (ii) the ability of a country to accommodate
industrial production (perhaps including easy start-up procedures, little corruption and
diversion), (iii) a flexible wage structure, and (iv) the ability of workers to move and to invest in
human capital (alternatively, state support of such investment).
40 Governments’ pro-export
policies (a shift from import substitution to active export promotion) may trigger this scenario;
hence, while international trade is a key element of this story, the trigger may deserve a separate
political economy analysis.
Note that the ’openness’ scenario is a market-driven story of growth: It starts with a
                                                
39 We have little information on financial markets in the EAP and SAS regions, which motivate this scenario. Hence,
it is hard for us to evaluate the role of financial markets in this process.
40 I.e. an elastic response of investment in human capital to rising skill wage premium.25
removal of a market barrier/wedge. To reap the benefits of this market opening, other factor
market mechanisms must be invoked, including human capital production and labor reallocation.
Market infrastructure must be able to support the accommodation of industrial production, etc.
At a more fundamental level, this scenario regards openness (and its immediate implications for
product markets) as the causal force behind growth. The causality may run in two directions.
First and foremost, international trade expands the size of the local market, which may have
growth promoting effects of fostering productivity and labor reallocation to manufacturing.
Trade provides demand for manufacturing output in low-income labor-abundant countries and
therefore fosters labor reallocation and schooling. The effect on productivity may come from
technology adoption, returns to scale, positive externalities, and international competition’s
disciplinary effect. Second, in this scenario import substitution policies lead to product market
distortions. These distortions (or the lack thereof) in turn feed into the workings of factor
markets, thereby reinforcing the growth effect of openness.
EAP. Characteristic features of this region (and apparently that of the region’s
governments’ long-term economic programs) are early export-oriented policies, high levels of
human capital, and high rates of growth. The central hypothesis of the scenario is that the steady
and high rates of growth of most of the countries of East Asia were a result of policies of export
promotion (and technology adoption in some cases), perhaps combined with high levels of
human capital which facilitated acquisition of tacit knowledge following from the adoption of
foreign technology.
41 Related questions, however, are the importance to the EAP growth story of
the role played by large-scale labor reallocation and the fact that political economy constraints
did not prevent useful product market interventions. Both may have to do with a relative
weakness of interest groups, in which case it would be interesting to study why protected
                                                
41 Cross-country regressions show that the Sachs-Warner openness index is highly correlated with a regional dummy
for East Asia; the countries of this region score high on this index relative to other developing countries. Yet, more
country-specific investigation of performance along the individual dimensions of this index, together with
description of the specifics of export-promotion policies, might provide a better idea of the potential relationship
between openness and growth. For example, were there different implications for growth of the ￿technology policy￿
pursued by South Korea from the policies adopted by other countries. The South Korean government directed funds
to particular firms for technology adoption in return for export production quotas.26
industries and labor unions did not become important.
Another question concerns whether any pre-conditions are necessary to drive this
scenario. This question comes to the fore upon comparison of EAP￿s growth with the low growth
of the SAS region, which was characterized by anti-openness policies. Although openness
policies represent a major difference between SAS and EAP, it appears that SAS countries also
suffered from a number of other factor and product market distortions, which may have
contributed to their low growth. Did EAP avoid these imperfections? To the extent that there do
exist necessary pre-conditions for the success of openness policies, likely candidate on the basis
of  EAP experience would include: low levels of natural resources, which do not suffocate
manufacturing and which may imply or coincide with weak labor unions and low corruption; a
threshold level of initial human capital stock; high savings; and macroeconomic stability.
One dissenting view with respect to the description of EAP growth offered by this
scenario is that the causality runs in the opposite direction: economic growth promoted exports
(Rodrik, 1994). If the latter hypothesis is correct, the sources of the initial growth need to be
identified. The above list of potential pre-conditions would appear to offer a natural point from
which to begin searching. Alternatively, high savings and investment may have offered the
original stimulus for the high growth rates.
SAS. This region may present a converse case of the EAP openness-and-success story.
Here, governments favored inward-oriented policies: import substitution, not export promotion.
This was apparently not optimal, as no South Asian country reported high growth in any decade
from 1950 to 1980 (Reynolds, 1985). SAS governments implemented centrally planned public-
sector oriented industrialization programs based on an economic nationalism doctrine. This
raises the political economy question of how and why this ideology was conceived. In particular,
were mistrust of markets and belief in state intervention related to the British colonial status of
SAS?
The economic nationalism programs called for restrictive trade and exchange rate
policies, which gave rise to overvalued exchange rates and product-market distortions (i.e.27
protection of specific industries). Furthermore, public firms and publicly financed investment
projects faced soft budget constraints; priority was given to basic, heavy industries; and
employment in public sector expanded fast, without regard to productivity. The anti-export
policies resulted in balance-of-payments deficits leading to a cycle of further import controls.
While even mild forms of central planning (mild in comparison to pre-transition ECA)
beget misallocation of resources and low growth, the driving force of low growth in SAS may be
related to the issue of openness. This conjecture, however, leads to a number of more specific
questions related to openness in the SAS context. In particular, how important are product
market distortions relative to factor market distortions in explaining SAS growth? For example,
Tendulkar and Sen (2001) note that legislative restrictions on employers led to the hiring of
contract labor and to adoption of capital-intensive technology. These authors also suggest that
progress in SAS in the 1980s in eliminating trade distortions was not matched by liberalization in
factor markets.
A second question relating to the importance of openness for SAS is whether inward-
oriented policies such as trade restrictions inhibit growth through their negative effect on demand
for exports (and hence investment), distortionary effect on product mix, or by encouraging rent
seeking? Alternatively, do they hamper growth through the reduction in foreign direct
investment, which would then imply less capital and less transfer of productivity-improving
technology? Guha-Khasnobis and Bari (2000) report that trade restrictions in SAS countries
actually correlated with higher growth, whereas the absence of foreign investment was
associated with lower growth.
Additional, largely unexplored potential explanations for lower growth in SAS than in
EAP are related to the importance of restrictions on the expansion of private enterprises, the
apparent under-investment in human capital combined with high fertility rates, the quality of
market infrastructure (corruption, commitment to contract enforcement, etc.), and the functioning
of financial markets (e.g., the apparent attempts of the governments to control banks and/or
interest rates). Initial conditions in SAS that could also be considered include a high proportion28
of agriculture in GDP and a potentially lower initial level of human capital.
Finally, the persistence of inward-oriented policies in SAS is likely related to a political
economy argument of path-dependence. (See the discussion of SAS in Section 6.2.)
6. 2 Responsiveness to Shocks
In this scenario a shock to the economic system either generates or reveals the need for a
major reallocation of resources from low-productivity to higher-productivity firms or sectors.
The extent to which the economy succeeds in reallocating resources will determine growth rates
in the short and medium term and may also have a significant impact on long-term growth rates.
Examples of such shocks include decreases in terms of trade for a country dependent upon
commodity exports, a financial crisis, or a change in the political regime, such as the beginning
of transition from a socialist to a capitalist economic system.
What is significant about this scenario is the need to reallocate massive quantities of
resources from existing to new uses. The required reallocation often involves significant labor
movement (across regions as well as industries), restructuring or closing of firms in low-
productivity sectors, and creation of firms in high-productivity sectors. The new equilibrium to
which the economy will move may either be a ￿high-growth￿ equilibrium, in which market
imperfections are sufficiently low to permit an efficient reallocation of resources, or a ￿low-
growth￿ equilibrium, in which market development is inadequate. Typical outcomes in a low-
growth equilibrium include expansion of the public sector to absorb workers displaced by the
shock (some MNA countries), retreat of displaced workers from industry to agriculture (some
ECA countries), or movement of labor from the formal to the informal sector (SSA). Each of
these outcomes may exert negative long-term effects on growth.
Market mechanisms that will determine the outcome of the shock are those that were
cited above in Sections 2-5 as relating to the reallocation of resources in labor, financial, and
product markets. In terms of market dimensions, whereas infrastructure, policies, and types of
participants all play an important role, infrastructure is crucial to achieving efficient resource
reallocation. Bankruptcy and collateral laws determine the likelihood that unprofitable firms are29
liquidated or restructured, freeing capital to move to more profitable activities. Restrictions on
hiring and firing affect both the probability that firms release redundant labor and the degree of
labor mobility across regions. The ease with which new firms can be created influences the speed
at which resources can be reallocated to profitable activities.
Although adequate market development appears to be a necessary condition for efficient
resource reallocation in response to a shock, it may not be sufficient: political economy factors
may also push the economy in the direction of the low-growth equilibrium. For example, groups
benefiting from the existing allocation of resources (such as firm owners or workers in particular
sectors) may put up strong resistance to reallocation. The degree of political will to tolerate (or
compensate) losers may be important in determining the new equilibrium after the shock. In
addition, government responses to the shock can influence the movement to a particular
equilibrium by influencing agents￿ beliefs regarding government credibility: if agents believe, for
example, that the government is not committed to reform, then entrepreneurs may be unwilling
to create new firms, thereby slowing movement to the high-growth equilibrium or pushing the
economy toward a low-growth equilibrium.
ECA. The countries of the ECA region have all faced the shock imposed by the transition
from socialism to capitalism, initiated in these countries at the beginning of the 1990s.
42 The
transition, which was motivated in part by a grossly inefficient allocation of resources during the
socialist regimes, created the need for resource reallocation on a massive scale. This task, which
would be enormous in any economy, has been made even more difficult in the ECA countries by
the virtually complete absence at the beginning of transition of infrastructure in all types of
markets and by the dominance of state participation in all markets.
43 The ECA countries have
had to put into place market infrastructure while at the same time reallocating resources
throughout the economy.
All of the ECA countries suffered a large fall in production at the beginning of the 1990s,
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43 Private sectors accounted for less than 10% of total production in most ECA countries prior to the transition.30
as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the abandonment of central planning, and, in
some countries, macroeconomic stabilization policies. One market variable that appears to
correlate with more rapid turnaround in growth rates following the declines is the commitment
by government to the rule of law and to contract enforcement.
44 Commitments such as these
foster financial sector development and encourage entry of private firms into product markets.
With respect to the response to the shock of transition, there is a marked contrast between
most of the former Soviet republics (excluding the Baltic countries) and the countries in Central
and Eastern Europe. The former have made noticeably less progress in developing markets and
have suffered low growth rates and significant increases in poverty, forcing a retreat of much of
the active population from industry to agriculture.
The distinction between the former Soviet Republics and Central and Eastern Europe also
applies to financial markets, especially to the commitment to the rule of law, which is sorely
missing in some of the former Soviet republics. These countries also exhibit smaller and more
poorly developed financial sectors and weak banking regulation. At the same time, all of the
ECA countries (with the exception of Hungary) have been slow to implement workable
bankruptcy laws, although the countries in the former Soviet Union have moved even more
slowly than other ECA countries. In addition, in all of the ECA countries newly created small
and medium-sized firms have had difficulty obtaining bank finance. High quantities of inherited
bad debt on state-owned banks￿ balance sheets and inexperience in lending on the basis of
market criteria are features of banking sectors that have contributed to this problem.
Labor market imperfections that have affected labor mobility in the ECA countries
include administrative restrictions on moves between regions, the tie of provision of social
services to the employer, and under-developed housing markets, together with rent controls for
much of the existing housing. As before, elimination of such barriers has proceeded much more
slowly in the former Soviet Union than in the other ECA  countries.
                                                
44 Successful macroeconomic policies also appear to correlate with growth increases.31
Product market imperfections that are likely to have played a role in differential
responses to the shock of transition are barriers to entry of new firms and the form and pace of
privatization of state-owned firms. Whereas rising self-employment has helped channel labor
from previous to new uses and has lowered unemployment rates, high barriers to entry and
corruption in Russia have translated into low self-employment rates.
45 Success in privatization
has varied across countries, with the former Soviet republics still reporting much greater shares
of the state-owned sector in GDP as late as 1999.
Interestingly, the degree of openness does not appear to explain much of the variation of
growth rates across ECA countries (although the level of foreign direct investment does correlate
with growth). Most of the ECA countries have adopted policies of openness, and many have
reoriented exports to countries outside the region. The determinants of foreign direct investment
appear to depend more on success in development of market infrastructure, commitment to the
rule of law, and political stability.
One caveat that must be raised with respect to the argument that market infrastructure and
market development are important for determining the growth performance of ECA countries is
the observation that the commitment to the rule of law￿in addition to representing development
of market infrastructure￿may also signal political commitment to the transition process. This
political commitment may encourage foreign direct investment and the creation of private firms
and, therefore, accelerate growth. The ECA countries that are lacking in a commitment to the
rule of law have also exhibited lack of progress in virtually every dimension of the transition,
suggesting the absence of political commitment.
A second caveat to our analysis of markets in ECA is the question of the role of initial
conditions. ECA countries that have reported poor growth performance throughout the 1990s
also faced weaker initial conditions, which included high proportions of agriculture and natural
resource extraction activities in GDP, lower levels of human capital, high proportions of trade to
                                                
45 Self-employment plays an important role in job creation in ECA countries; job creation in small newly established
private businesses appears to be the driving force of successful transition (see, e.g., Jurajda and Terrell, 2000).32
the Soviet block, smaller initial private sectors, and less historical experience with democracy or
capitalism. The importance of initial conditions versus policies has been a continuing source of
debate with respect to ECA countries.
SSA. While the long-term growth performance of most SSA countries has been poor in
relation to that of developing economies in other regions, half of the SSA countries experienced
reasonable growth rates throughout the 1960s but then suffered drastic falls in the 1970s (Ndulu
and O￿Connell, 1999, 2000, and Prichett, 2000). A question raised by this experience is whether
the sharp declines in growth followed a major shock. Information regarding any shocks
preceding the growth declines and the specific responses of different countries to the shocks
could provide valuable insight into the fall in growth of these countries.
One observation that appears to hold at a very general level for all of SSA is that these
countries have failed to develop their manufacturing sectors sufficiently to reallocate labor from
agriculture to manufacturing or from the informal to the formal sector. Agricultural production
remains a very high proportion of GDP. Furthermore, significant imperfections exist across all
types of markets in SSA; therefore, it is difficult to point to any one area that might be
responsible for the failure to develop the manufacturing sector. Our account (provided in the
discussion of Section 6.4) of the many market imperfections in the SSA region does not allow us
to distinguish between the SSA countries that experienced respectable growth rates in the 1960s
and then suffered setbacks from those countries that have shown consistently weak growth since
1960.
MNA. Growth rates in MNA countries are more volatile than in other regions, and the
growth trends appear to follow trends in oil prices. Much of the long-term growth experience of
the MNA region is related to the theme of the natural resource scenario (Section 6.3); however,
negative oil price shocks in the 1980s appear to have had different effects across countries within
the MNA region.
For example, public sectors are disproportionately large in MNA countries, implying that
the government is a major participant in labor markets. As the discussion of the natural resource33
scenario suggests, the size of the public sectors may have contributed to a misallocation of
human capital. Whereas some of the MNA countries responded to negative oil price shocks in
the 1980s by drawing on foreign reserves to maintain government spending, countries that were
more financially constrained were forced to limit government expenditures in response to the
price shocks. An important question is whether the latter group of countries was forced to reduce
public-sector wages or the extent of government hiring of skilled workers and whether there was
an indirect, positive effect on the allocation of labor or capital through movement into the private
sector. Did negative oil price shocks push financially constrained economies in the direction of a
￿high-growth￿ equilibrium in response to the shock?
SAS. While the SAS region has been characterized by policies of import substitution
described in Section 6.1, recently, the region experienced a considerable reduction in inward
orientation and a move toward product market liberalization. According to Tendulkar and Sen
(2000), the liberalization was caused by the necessity of reacting to external shocks and
economic crises, rather than by long-term strategy. Tendulkar and Sen (2000) argue that
measurable progress in eliminating trade distortions has not been matched by liberalization in
factor markets. This may be attributable to political economy problems originating in the past
strategy of inward orientation: the bloated state-owned sector and the protected industries oppose
reforms, which would curtail their rents. Market distortions introduced by inward-oriented
policies may be reinforcing themselves beyond product markets.
LAC. Like a number of SSA countries, LA countries exhibited reasonable growth rates
during the 1960s and 1970s but suffered severe declines in growth (exhibiting negative growth
rates) during the 1980s. Several LA countries suffered financial crises during the 1980s, raising
the question of the extent to which these crises constituted shocks that may have been followed
by movement to a ￿low-growth￿ equilibrium. The growth rates of some LA countries have
recovered in the 1990s, and observers have suggested that market reforms may have played a
role in the recovery. The extent to which shocks to the financial sector in the 1980s exposed the
need may have contributed to low growth and the extent to which reforms leading to34
improvements in factor or product markets in the 1990s may have resulted in increases in growth
rates remain open questions.
Market imperfections in LAC that have been suggested to have exerted negative effects
on long-term growth include policies of financial repression, lack of openness, and low rates of
human capital accumulation in some countries. The pervasiveness of financial repression and
financial crises in LA suggests that financial markets may have had an important influence on
growth in this region. However, as discussed in Section 2, the effect of financial repression on
growth is ambiguous due to the uncertain response of savings to interest rate changes. In
addition, some research has indicated that financial crises have followed financial liberalization
in some LAC countries. Weak financial market infrastructure and banking supervision may have
allowed newly liberalized banks to take on excessively risky investment, leading to a crisis.
The role of a lack of openness in explaining LA growth performance also remains an
open question. Although many LA countries rated poorly on indicators of openness, some of
these countries nevertheless exhibited relatively high growth rates. Again, the question of
explanations for the sharp declines in LA growth rates in the 1980s arises. Information on terms
of trade shocks or changes in openness would be useful for providing an answer to this question.
One caveat to the claim that market imperfections may have heavily influenced the
growth performance of LA is that macroeconomic policy may be potentially important relative to
market imperfections in explaining growth in this region. Poor macroeconomic policy has been
reflected in very high inflation rates and has been cited as contributing negatively to growth in
LA.
6.3 Natural-Resource Curse
In this scenario, motivated by the MNA region (and potentially also by LAC and SSA),
high natural resource endowments are present in a developing country that exhibits weak
markets or weak democracy or myopic governments. Comparative advantage leads to
dependence on one sector of the economy: natural resource extraction; this in turn naturally
makes economic policies and growth depend on commodity prices (and their volatility). A more35
damaging problem, however, is that poor market infrastructure or bad governments interact with
natural resources: Either rent seeking related to extraction becomes pervasive or high resource
revenues are misallocated, typically into supporting bloated public sectors.
Rent seeking during natural-resource booms may be related to pre-boom quality of
market infrastructure, which is a question for country-specific research. The policy failure of
overstaffing the public sector may be a result of a false sense of security ensuing from high oil
revenues. It leads to buildup of pressure groups opposing reallocation and negatively feeds back
into growth (see the reallocation scenario in Section 6.2). This is where the growth mechanism of
human-capital accumulation may break down because of extensive inefficient allocation of
human capital.
While the above-mentioned market mechanisms appear important, the analysis of
natural-resource policy failure is primarily a task of political economy. High natural resource
endowments pose a significant policy challenge for governments of developing nations.
Although it would appear relatively easy to propose appropriate growth-enhancing policy,
46 the
political economy question that arises is why these policies are not being implemented.
MNA. The region is rich in its endowment of natural resources. High oil-export revenues
have permitted the oil-producing countries to undertake significant public investment, including
improvement in education. Yet, one of the key puzzles raised by the experience of this region is
the observation that steady increases in human capital have not translated into increases in
growth. Measures of total factor productivity reveal an average decline in TFP growth in the
region during the period 1960-1990.
 47
One hypothesis explaining the weak link between human capital acquisition and growth
in this region is that labor has been misallocated, as a result of swollen public sectors, which
absorb a high fraction of the skilled work force and which jeopardize the ability of private
                                                
46 For example, to prevent corruption, governments should allocate resources by market prices rather than by fiat.
47 Comparing EAP and MNA should prove useful in explaining the puzzle: As we have noted in Section 6.1, high
levels of human capital are often cited as contributing to the growth rates of East Asia. Contrary to the MNA region,
it appears that human capital acquisition may well have contributed positively to growth.36
sectors to attract skilled workers.
48 Public sector wages appear to be higher in this region than in
any other region. This leads to difficulty for the private sector to create jobs, which further
increases the pressure on the public sector to absorb labor market entrants. What is less clear is
whether labor market infrastructure or labor market policies reinforce the misallocation of labor.
Country studies could yield insight into this issue via the gathering of information on labor
market infrastructure, policies, and the extent of government hiring.
While the dependence on oil is a consequence of comparative advantage, several of the
countries of this region have maintained low degrees of openness, which would tend to
strengthen the dependence on oil. A caveat to the natural-resource scenario therefore depends on
the extent to which the lack of openness may have contributed to low growth rates independently
of any effect via oil export dependence. A fruitful avenue of research along these lines would be
a comparison of openness policies across the countries of the region, in relation to the presence
of oil.
Just as human capital accumulation does not seem to have increased growth rates in the
MNA region, high savings rates and investment ratios similar to those of East Asia do not seem
to have translated into growth rates similar to those of the latter region. A potential explanation
relates once again to the size of the public sector, the hypothesis being that investment has been
directed to low-productivity projects, such as housing. Another potential explanation, however,
is that financial systems are not attracting the savings or allocating them efficiently. Information
relating to the infrastructure, policy, and the functioning of financial markets across countries of
this region would be valuable for assessing the role that financial systems have played in
attracting savings and directing them to their most productive uses.
Finally, initial conditions that have likely played a role, in addition to the endowment of
oil, in explaining the historical growth performance of this region are low literacy rates, arising
in part from the bias against educating females. Country-specific shocks that also may have
                                                
48 In Egypt the government alone employs more than one half of the holders of university degrees in the economy.37
contributed to variability in growth include civil and regional wars.
6.4 Consistently Low Growth
As noted above, roughly half of the SSA countries have exhibited low growth rates over
very long periods of time. Market imperfections that could be expected to limit growth are severe
and pervasive in the SSA economies. Yet, because so many problems exist, it may be difficult to
identify one key explanation for low growth. Complementarities in market reforms may yield
convexities in outcomes, which would imply that growth performance is significantly poorer in
countries where problems exist in most market dimensions, as opposed to a few. Or, as Collier
and Gunning (1999) suggest, initial low growth may lead to a self-reinforcing, low-growth trap.
A fruitful approach to understanding the poor growth performance of SSA countries
would be to identify policy or institutional variables that differentiate the group of SSA countries
that performed reasonably well during the 1960s from the group of low-growth countries. As
was suggested in the shock scenario of Section 6.2, growth rates of the countries with initially
good performance may have dropped as a result of a negative shock. A related question with
respect to the consistently low-growth countries is whether these countries experienced a series
of negative shocks. If not, market imperfections offer a potentially convincing  explanation for
the persistence of low growth rates.
   Severe product market imperfections in SSA include lack of infrastructure and heavy
use of  policy wedges. Among the deficiencies in infrastructure are restrictions on entry of new
firms, and weak transportation and communications infrastructure. Weak infrastructure leads to
uncertain input supplies, to which firms respond by inefficiently producing their own inputs. For
example, many firms react to uncertain electricity supply by producing their own electricity.
(Collier and Gunning, 1999)  Poor product market infrastructure has increased the costs of
production and trade, thereby reducing the potential for growth.
 Policy wedges in product markets include import substitution policies, protection for
certain firms, heavy regulation of trade, overvalued exchange rates, and other trade barriers. In
addition, an urban bias on the part of governments has resulted in heavy taxation of agriculture in38
some countries.
With respect to the types of participants in product markets, few foreign firms are present
and rates of foreign investment in SSA are very low. The proportion of global private capital
flowing into SSA declined from the 1970s to the 1990s. Potential market explanations for the
exceptionally low rates of FDI include policy wedges relating to international trade (i.e., lack of
openness), as well as extensive corruption among public officials and lack of commitment to
contract enforcement.
49 The latter two factors have also undoubtedly discouraged domestic
investment. In 1995 SSA was ranked the riskiest region in the world for investors. Rates of
return on private capital have been very low, probably reflecting the severe product market
imperfections.
Labor markets are also fraught with problems.
50 Labor markets are highly segmented in
SSA; formal and informal markets coexist, and informal markets are large. Informal and
agricultural labor markets have served as the ￿sponge￿ for absorbing high numbers of otherwise
unemployed. Unemployment rates among educated youth are high in SSA. Although the size of
informal labor markets likely reflects weak demand for labor by the formal sector￿itself a result
of low rates of investment￿an interesting question that could be pursued in country-specific
studies is to what extent imperfections in labor markets limit labor mobility from the informal to
the formal sector. For example, Adenikinju and Oyeranti (1999) argue that lack of formal
information on job openings results in most of the hiring in the formal sector occurring primarily
through relations with family and  friends.
Government participation in labor markets in SSA has been extensive, with governments
often serving as the employer of last resort. According to Adenikinju and Oyeranti (1999),
public-sector employment accounts for as much as sixty to eighty percent of nonagricultural
employment in several African countries. High levels of public-sector employment translate into
                                                
49 An issue of debate relating to SSA performance has been the importance of openness relative to other market-
related policies. See Collier and Gunning (1999) for an excellent discussion.
50 Our discussion of labor and financial markets draws liberally from Adenikinju and Oyeranti (1999).39
high levels of government expenditure and lower average productivity, as skilled labor is
discouraged from moving into manufacturing. In addition, Adenikinju and Oyeranti (1999)
suggest that declines in real wages in the public sector have contributed to corruption by
government employees.
Financial market imperfections in SSA are severe, and they must certainly have
contributed to low growth through the failure to stem the high flow of savings out of the region.
Financial market infrastructure is extremely weak: legal institutions and credible means of
enforcing contracts are severely lacking in many countries.
51 Informal credit markets
characterize the financial sector in rural areas; formal financial intermediaries are concentrated in
urban areas.
The appearance of informal credit markets may actually have a positive effect on growth,
as an efficient response to costly information problems arising in rural lending. However, funds
do not appear to flow from the formal to the informal sector; therefore, informal money lenders￿
funds are limited. This in turn limits the extent to which capital may be efficiently allocated in
rural areas.
Costly policy wedges are prevalent in the formal financial sector: interest rates have been
regulated; high requirements placed on banks￿ reserves; and much bank lending has been
directed to state-owned or otherwise favored firms. Implicit taxation of unremunerated required
reserves has been estimated to exceed banks￿ value-added in some SSA countries. Extensive use
of directed lending has resulted in very high rates of loan defaults on banks￿ balance sheets;
percentages of bad loans have reached as high as 40-95%. Directed lending and weak banking
regulation have led to protracted or repeated banking crises in many countries. Nigeria and
Kenya offer examples where banking crises resulted from weak regulation following financial
sector liberalization. Both low interest rates and frequent banking crises have likely exacerbated
                                                
51 For example, Adenikinju and Oyeranti (1999) report that bankruptcy procedures in Kenya are said to last from
four to ten years.40
the flight of capital from the region.
52
Despite the plethora of market imperfections that could potentially lead to low rates of
growth in SSA countries, an open question relating to the poor SSA performance and an issue of
debate has concerned the role of initial conditions relative to policies. Initial conditions that have
been linked to weak growth performance include a large agricultural labor force, high fertility
rates, low levels of human capital, geography (a large number of land-locked countries), and a
high degree of ethnic diversity (see Collier and Gunning, 1999).
7 Conclusion
We argue in this paper that market policies and institutions have a crucial impact on
economic growth. We explore the dimensions through which product, labor, financial, and
natural resource markets may affect growth, then we develop four growth scenarios through
which we summarize the findings of six regional papers dealing with markets and growth.
Several observations emerge from our analysis. First, financial market ￿infrastructure￿ is
important.  Commitments to law and order and to contract enforcement are potentially significant
determinants of financial sector development and economic growth. We speculate that other
features of financial market development may be of only secondary magnitude in comparison.
Financial market infrastructure can also affect the outcome of financial liberalization policies;
liberalization in the face of weak banking regulation, for example, can result in a financial crisis.
A second observation relates to the lack of research on the relationship between labor
markets and growth, as opposed to the relationship between human capital production and
growth. We highlight the need to fill this gap, pointing to the importance of labor markets in the
efficient allocation of human capital in addition to its production. Human-capital production may
be a necessary condition for growth, while an efficient allocation of human capital (related, e.g.,
to political economy) may constitute a sufficient condition.
                                                
52 Adenikinju and Oyeranti (1999) note that much of the capital flight involves money stolen from the
government￿another indication of the pervasiveness of corruption.41
A third observation concerns the importance of efficient factor reallocation in response to
shocks: unsuccessful reallocation following a shock can lead to a low-growth equilibrium with
negative long-run effects. The presence of social safety nets and the strength of pressure groups
may affect the speed and efficiency with which labor can be reallocated across sectors or regions.
Finally, our examination of financial and labor markets suggests that factor markets are
important for growth. A question that nevertheless remains open is whether factor markets serve
more as facilitators of product market reforms or of positive responses to shocks, or whether
labor or financial market reforms alone can generate large increases in economic growth.
53
The country studies of the GRP project have a unique opportunity to verify or reject
important growth theories by focusing their detailed investigation on the relevant mechanisms of
growth.
54 Finally, our growth scenarios also offer testable hypotheses about causality links that
country-specific analysis can shed light on.
                                                
53 For example, in the "openness" growth scenario, there are necessary conditions on the factor markets that support
growth, but the sufficient stimulus is coming from product markets.
54 They can also consider the dependence of policy choice (in product and factor markets) on initial conditions.42
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